Anthropology, Philosophy, and the Challenge of Barbarous Universalism[1]

Joseph Grim Feinberg

Abstract: There is rich tradition of interaction between anthropology and philosophy. This article reflects on the character of this interaction, arguing that it is not a case of two separate, parallel traditions that mutually influence one another, but rather of two interconnected disciplines that have become necessary to one another's development. Both disciplines aim at a universalistic understanding of the human being, but each does so by different means. Philosophy allows the autonomous work of reason to criticize established categories of thought, positing new concepts of the human; but it risks becoming too autonomous – too self-sufficient and self-referential – thus allowing its categories to become resistant to criticism, established as marks of "civilization" that distinguish philosophical ideas from ideas that are non-philosophical, irrational, and barbarous. Anthropology, for its part, reveals the limitations of premature universalism, pointing to forms of reason excluded from dominant systems of thought. Philosophy can turn to anthropology in order to expand and bring in new concepts. Anthropology can turn to philosophy in order to recall its original impulse toward conceptualizing the universal, in an expansive form that I call "barbarous universalism".

Keywords: Anthropological method; philosophical anthropology; history of philosophy; history of anthropology; alternative rationalities; humanism; universalism

---

[1] This paper is based on a lecture given at the biennial conference of the Czech Association for Social Anthropology (CASA), online, April 17, 2021.

A few years ago I helped edit the Czech publication (Tamás, 2016: 202–18) of a remarkable essay by the philosopher G. M. Tamás. In it, Tamás sings praises to the emancipatory potential of his discipline (Tamás 2014), writing, "Philosophy as a discipline is hostile, because of its conceptual and unavoidably universalist nature, to difference – and thus to inequality and hierarchy". (2014: 229) "Difference", in Tamás's understanding, implies "division, distinction, differentiation", all of which are "aspects of force" (2014: 218), elements of social order that classifies people and distributes value and suffering to those who are superior or inferior, according to the anti-egalitarian principle known as "justice".

When people struggle for justice, Tamás goes on, they are often tempted to "go to the people", uncritically registering and accepting the views of the excluded and oppressed. With the best of intentions, such fighters for justice abandon the universalist project of philosophy in favor of communalisms and tribalisms (2014: 228–29). Like Christians displacing transcendence into another realm, they take temporal and temporary solace in the degraded life of those they defend (2014: 229); they advocate for peoples just as they are, instead of imagining a new world for everyone. Philosophy, Tamás says, is not a champion of one set of people or another, or of one part of society set against another, but is "an enemy of any and all societies based on distinction and justice" (2014: 223). All particular principles of categorial exclusion crumble under philosophy's critical gaze.

In framing the project of emancipatory thought this way, Tamás offers a particular challenge to anthropology, a discipline known for its attention to difference, its fascination with structure and categories, its tendency to study not universal inclusion and ideal states, but excluded voices and actually existing conditions. And if we take anthropology together with its sister fields of folklore and ethnology, surely there is no scholarly discipline that holds more in common with the revolutionary project of "going to the people". If the mission of philosophy were to renounce the divergent thoughts of different peoples in favor of radically universalist reason unbounded by particular conditions, then what could anthropology ever have to do with it? What could it possibly mean to combine anthropology and philosophy?

The love of wisdom and the study of the human

Whether the effort is theoretically founded or not, I've been mixing anthropology and philosophy for a long time now. After studying sociocultural anthropology in graduate school, I found a job at an institute devoted to philosophy, and I've spent the last ten years trying to show that I really know how to practice my institute's nominal discipline. Even if I've been grappling with the same fundamental question all along – how to understand the human being in the world – my two disciplines approach the question by different means, and this compels me to ask what the disciplines have to say to one another.

Anthropology and philosophy, then. I am far from the first person to reflect on their interaction (see, e.g., Giri and Clammer, 2013; Das et al., 2014). Anthropologists have borrowed ideas from philosophers ("ontology", "dialectics", "discursive regimes", just to name a few), and philosophers have borrowed ideas from anthropologists ("culture", "structure", the concept of "the gift", and others). But insofar as the disciplines do different things with the ideas they develop, borrow, and adapt, each keeping to its own purposes, there is no conceptual problem to address. There is only a problem – a question worth answering – if we consider that the disciplines, even when their approaches diverge, are still doing *the same things* and cannot be so easily separated. Then the disciplines' divergent approaches may come into conflict with one another, and we can ask what the resulting tension produces.

My intent, then, is not to define the difference between the disciplines so that each might keep to itself and focus on its strengths. Rather, I want to suggest that by understanding the difference between the disciplines, we can better understand what brings them together. Each discipline, when left to its own devices, is limited in just the way that the other discipline excels. And these limitations have historically driven each discipline to turn to the other (though less often than it might have) for help. If this essay diverges, then, from previous approaches to the relationship between anthropology and philosophy, it is above all in this respect: I want to emphasize and explore this divergent affinity between the disciplines, which I take to be the key to understanding their interrelation, not only as a relationship between two mutually fertilizing but independent traditions (shown well by Giri and Clammer, 2013), nor as an encounter taking place primarily in a special "ground between" (Das et al., 2014), where practitioners can step out of disciplinary isolation to explore both disciplines, but above all as a relationship of *inseparability*. Anthropology and philosophy have been drawn historically together, and they separate themselves from one another only at the risk of undermining their own purposes.

Let's begin, provisionally, with the common notion that philosophy is the art of abstract thought, generalization, and universalism (which criticizes problematic forms of particularism), while anthropology is an art of understanding cultural[2] particularity (as it "goes to the people" to learn from them, instead of relying too heavily on aggregate data and the abstract reason of elites). A critically oriented philosopher might object that philosophy also concretizes its abstractions, specifies the conditions of its generalizations, and identifies the particular context of its universal stipulations. A critically oriented anthropologist might likewise point to the universal similarities among different human practices and experiences, and to the conceptualizations of the world and humanity that emerge in differing local contexts. And this is the point: each discipline appears inadequate to its idea of itself, so long as it pursues only the approach that is typically identified with it. Philosophy only becomes capable of conceptualizing a truly universal subject, overcoming oppressive divisions, when it recognizes what it has left out, and when it begins (if you'll permit the neologism) to anthropologize. And anthropology only gives due to the marginalized and overlooked people it studies if it also looks beyond their particular contexts, philosophizing on their place in the universe. Their starting points and endpoints may appear to be opposite – philosophy tends to reach from the universal to the particular, anthropology from the particular to the universal – but they pass through the same territory in the middle.

---

[2] It will be clear to readers that I have in mind *primarily* the kind of anthropology known as cultural or sociocultural. But I take this form of anthropology to be paradigmatic of the field as a whole, which attempts to understand the totality of the human being through

This generalizing about the disciplines (a very philosophical move, perhaps) calls for specification. I should temper it with an anthropological attempt to situate the fields in their unfolding social context. I'm convinced that only an anthropological approach can adequately situate philosophy in society, but I also think it's worth giving anthropology a dose of philosophy, in order to speculate on what essential substance might lie beneath its surface appearances – *what kind of philosophy* anthropology can do.

The contradictions of philosophy

Although I eventually left anthropology for philosophy, it was initially philosophy that led me to anthropology. In this respect, my personal trajectory followed the trajectory of anthropology as a whole. Anthropology could be born because philosophy had already spent centuries posing a series of compelling questions that anthropology could answer in new ways. When philosophy's answers ceased to appear adequate to its social context and historical moment, anthropology stepped in.

---

its particular manifestations (which may be physical and ecological as well as cultural), origins (which reach back to times before the existence of *Homo sapiens*), and ecological vicinity (which has taken anthropology beyond the realm of the strictly human, without abandoning anthropology's fundamental interest in humans).

But before discussing how anthropology reacted to philosophy's questions, we should try to understand those questions in their own terms. How did some questions come to be posed in a peculiar way that would be considered "philosophical"? To be clear: I am not interested in the intellectual-historical question of how Great Ideas were born in the minds of Great Thinkers, but in the anthropological question of how a specific sociocultural practice made it possible to think that some ideas and some thinkers were Great. And I am interested in the question – at the crossroads of anthropology and philosophy – of how philosophy's attachment to Great Thinkers has repeatedly undermined its ability to realize the great potential of its ideas, and has made (something like) anthropology necessary to philosophy.

If philosophy were defined only by its propensity to abstract thought, generalization, and universalism, this would not seem to go far in clarifying philosophy's cultural specificity. Not only are the same qualities found in other academic disciplines, but, as anthropologists have observed, they are dispersed far beyond the walls of the academy: people everywhere engage in abstract thought, look for meaning that transcends their immediate experience, and generate ideas to express their wonder at the nature of the world (e.g. Radin, 1927; Arola, 2011; Dismas, 2016). The issue is to determine how abstraction, generalization, and universalism come to be applied in a sustained way, creating new concepts (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 5) or systems of concepts (Ilyenkov and Korovikov, 2019: 72) that develop semi-autonomously, according to a logic that is self-contained and therefore not wholly dependent on already-established categories of thought. This is what enables philosophy, at its most radically critical moments, to appear as an "enemy of any and all societies based on distinction" (Tamás, 2014: 223): it sets aside a little field of practice where the distinctions of the rest of the world matter less (or seem to matter less, are declared to matter less) than the inner workings of reason, speculation, contemplation, meditation.

It is not necessary to accept at face value the traditional account that philosophy was born independently only in ancient Greece, India, and China,[3] from where it was disseminated around the world. Paul Radin's anthropological classic, *Primitive Man as Philosopher* (Radin, 1927, esp. chs. XV and XVI), points to a more dynamic understanding: all societies have systematic thinkers, and all societies have many more people who shun systematic thought. Philosophy (if I may freely develop Radin's insight) develops through a process of *setting apart*, which can begin in almost any society, but which has historically developed into extreme forms only in specific historical situations. In this process the technology of writing has played an important, though not indispensable, role, not only because it leaves a record for later historians of philosophy, but also because it allows multiple generations and geographical centers to participate in the same philosophical process, making it easier to accumulate the critical mass of philosophically inclined people needed to keep a tradition alive. While every generation in every village may have its musicians and storytellers, and thus no need of writing for effective transmission, systematic philosophy might be forgotten and might skip generations, and a philosophically inclined individual might have to go far or reach far back in time to find someone else with whom to engage in disputation. Nevertheless, the core of philosophical practice does not lie in writing as such (and sometimes not in writing at all), but in a certain approach to ideas.

---

[3] It was of course only the Greeks who called their practice philosophy (*filosofia*), because their concept became the basis for the words used in modern intellectual traditions. In the ancient Indian world, the term *darshana* covered a similar range of activity—similar not least in the fact that neither ancient Greek nor ancient Indian tradition distinguished clearly between philosophy, literature, and religion. Ancient China, for its part, may have had no word for philosophy as such, but it is clear that an analogous genre of practice was recognized and highly valued (Cua, 2008: 43–46).

What had to happen so that some of the world's immense wealth of ideas could be set apart, debated, and recognized as philosophical concepts? The Greek term for this practice, "*filosofia*", suggests one possible answer.

According to Cicero (who claimed to be reporting a widespread legend), Pythagoras distinguished philosophers from other people on the basis of what they "loved". While some people sought glory and honor and others sought wealth, philosophers sought only wisdom, "earnestly look[ing] into the nature of things" (Cicero, 1877: 166). And this love of wisdom, this eagerness "to be a looker-on without making any acquisition", he said, was "the most reputable occupation of all", because the contemplation of things "greatly exceeds every other pursuit of life" (Cicero, 1877: 166). From the start, then, according to this ancient legend, philosophy was defined not by the content of its ideas, but by an attitude and a way of interacting with the world. Philosophers know that they love wisdom. They know what wisdom is (that is, they talk about it and define it); they actively pursue wisdom instead of pursuing other things; and they know that they are the ones who pursue it. They have a name for themselves, and they express pride in their "occupation".

It is a certain economy of desire, by this account, that enables the pursuit of wisdom to be recognized as an autonomous activity: by not loving other things, philosophers could love wisdom. Plato's *Symposium* marks the connection of philosophy to Eros still more deeply, presenting the famous theory that love of particular bodies should mature into love of universal forms (210a–212a). By redirecting desires, renouncing competing social practices like the competition for glory or money or sex, philosophers were supposed to contemplate things disinterestedly, observing the world from a position of remove. In this respect, the notion of a "discipline" perhaps applies better to philosophy than to any other academic field. In its moments of origin (and elsewhere at least as strikingly as in Greece), philosophy declares its independence through a process of self-discipline.

This demonstrative denial of social engagement, of course, contrasted starkly with much of actual philosophical practice, in the ancient world as much as today. (Already Pythagoras and his followers – just to follow the characters in Cicero's story – were reputed to be powerful political players in the cities where they lived.) And philosophy's repeated denial of its social positioning, its insistence that it is independent of the world around it, would be the source of an ongoing contradiction in the history of the field. But at crucial moments the declarative renunciation of other worldly interests and desires can be understood as a significant founding gesture: philosophers cut themselves off from the world in order to change themselves, to establish a new way of living (an "ethics") that could make them better people, capable of observing the world, understanding its nature, and then returning to advise or criticize the world's rulers and to show how the world could be changed.

So, it is not the pursuit of wisdom alone that defines philosophy. As long as wisdom, in any given context, is pursued in accordance with pre-established codes of ethics or belief, or if the pursuit of wisdom is obtained through unique personal experience or otherworldly revelation, then it does not become philosophy. But if pursuers of wisdom believe themselves to be working through the inherent logic of wisdom itself – if they ask, for example, whether the existence of gods or souls or kings can be reconciled with reason, or whether the world really is the way it appears – then we can say that philosophy as a distinct field has come into being.[4]

---

[4] It may be worth commenting here on the genre known as "wisdom literature" that was prevalent throughout the eastern Mediterranean and Mesopotamian regions even before the beginnings of Greek philosophy. Insofar as this literature points to tensions between competing moral principles and sometimes develops established principles to surprising and contradictory conclusions about the fundamental nature of things, it no doubt contains philosophical elements, and it might have influenced the first self-conscious philosophers. (For example: the literary power of *Ecclesiastes*, probably the best-known representative of wisdom literature, lies largely in its mastery of contradiction, its depiction of life's beauty contraposed to the insight that "all is vanity", or, literally, that "all is vapor/breath" (Eccl, 1:2). This bears striking resemblance to Anaximenes's contention that all things are composed of air, and to Heraclitus's contention that all is flux.) But at other moments, when wisdom literature propagates already-accepted principles of wisdom, without interest in

Once the pursuit of wisdom or analogous concepts was set apart from other pursuits – a similar setting-apart took place in India with concepts like "enlightenment" or "liberation" (*moksha*) and in China with concepts like "the way" (*dao*)[5] – philosophers could develop the implications of their concepts in their own terms, without immediate reference to other culturally established principles, but according to their own method of reasoning or disputation, which Greek tradition called *logos*, *analytika*, or *dialektike* (see e.g. Bobzien, 2020), Indian tradition called *nyaya* (e.g. Gillon, 2023), and Chinese tradition called *bian*, among other names (e.g. William, 2023). And philosophers would often find that logic led them to positions that contradicted prevailing attitudes and beliefs. The validity of philosophical knowledge, then, did not depend on the articulation of specific substantive truths, or on special access to newly revealed truth (as was the case with prophets and oracles), but on adherence to certain methods, which might yield different results at different moments and to different practitioners.

But at the time philosophy was coming into being in this distinct form, it was not the only thing that presented a challenge to the established order. Several authors have noted that the first sustained and recorded stirrings of distinctly

---

the contradictions between principles or in the development of new principles, it is not acting philosophically.

In the Indian world, the connection between philosophy and earlier wisdom-oriented literature is still clearer: the first philosophers inscribed themselves in the tradition of the Vedas, whose name can be literally understood as "writing on knowledge/wisdom". Over time the systematic pursuit of knowledge led to competing schools or worldviews (*darshana*), which show all the basic characteristics of philosophy.

[5] I am aware, in writing this, that in the process of identifying Indian and Chinese analogies to Greek concepts, I am interpreting those other intellectual traditions through the lens of Greece (which, in turn, I interpret through the lens of my own modern-Western-philosophical formation, which anachronistically takes ancient Greece to be "Western"). It would be at least as enlightening to interpret the Greek and Western traditions through the lens of non-Greek and non-Western concepts, but my present purpose is to understand the conceptual genealogy of a field constituted on the basis of the Western interpretation of the Greek model, which has been gradually expanding toward the rest of the world. I only hope this kind of approach, which at least questions the uniqueness of supposedly Western accomplishments, can encourage others to take the next step. One telling missed opportunity: The *Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy* (Edelglass and Garfield, 2011) has no section on the Greek or Western traditions, as if little would be gained by rethinking these traditions in relation to other traditions. (The editors, aware of this omission, write, "most contemporary academic philosophers in the world are acquainted with the European tradition, and so take 'world philosophy' to be like 'world music'—everything but European. There will, we hope, come a time when the European case is so unmarked that this would be an inexcusable exclusion. But that time has not yet come." [Edelglass and Garfield, 2011: 6])

philosophical practice in ancient Greece, India, and China coincided with the emergence of coinage in the same locations.[6] They suggest that the minting and exchange of coins suddenly presented people with a substance that seemed capable of turning into anything, ruling over anything, underlying anything. At the same time, this substance radically disrupted the accepted moral order, competing for allegiance with gods, kings, and kin while throwing masses of once-free people into indentured servitude. Although few preserved texts of early philosophers definitively prove the hypothesis that coinage directly inspired their ruminations on metaphysics, the historical-geographical coincidence appears too striking to ignore – and the writings of Plato and Aristotle, at least, are rife with lamentations about the effects of money (as are many contemporaneous theological texts, where the language of debt and redemption was explicitly appropriated and given eschatological meaning). Alongside this outrageous newcomer, philosophers began to propose other bases of nature and community – more morally adequate substances that could ground alternative conceptions of the world.

A second, equally disruptive force came from the rise of empires, whose expansionary political claims opened space for expansive conceptual claims. When a single political order could plausibly aspire to govern the whole world, the intellectuals of the realm would also be spurred to imagine the nature of the world, not only as it appeared in their immediate environment, but also as a global totality (Baldry, 1965; Heater, 1996, chap. 1; Chun, 2012; Halim, 2013; Lavan, Payne, and Weisweiler, 2016). Philosophers' universalism became both a logical principle (that the world is composed of basic substances or operates by fundamental rules) and a human-geographical principle connected to a concept of cosmopolitan community (the idea that all people in the world might live together, in a shared moral or political system). Such ideas could justify imperial expansion, but – as Tamás argued – they also articulated protest against existing orders that divided people irrationally and unfairly. Philosophy became associated with what modern Europe called "civilization", the elite cultural accompaniment to imperial expansion. But in many ways philosophy was less civilization's champion than its bad conscience. In all three regions classically identified with the origins of philosophy, larger states began to emerge, replacing systems of small "warring states" (as Chinese historiography calls them), and many of their philosophers began to ask: *What*

---

[6] This has been recently argued compellingly by David Graeber in his book on *Debt* (Graeber, 2014: 244–47), which draws on the work of Mark Shell (Shell, 1978) and Richard Seaford (Seaford, 2004). But roughly the same idea was already put forth in the 1950s by George Thomson, a Marxist historian of ancient Greek philosophy (Thomson, 1949, II: The First Philosophers:94–96), and it was suggested in the 1920s by György Lukács (Lukács, 1971a, 111).

new moral, political, or ontological principles would it take for emerging polities really to be justified when they claim the right to include everyone?

Philosophy reacts to the loss of old ways, which had become irretrievable, and to dissatisfaction with new ways, which had become unbearable. György Lukács has characterized this contradictory tendency of philosophy strikingly: "The happy ages", he writes, "have no philosophy, or […] (it comes to the same thing) all men in such ages are philosophers, sharing the Utopian aim of every philosophy" (Lukács, 1971: 29). Philosophy, born to confront a problematic world, tends to imagine a world without problems. But if such a world ever came to be – if all people ever began to accept a certain philosophical ideal – philosophy would cease to exist as a struggle between "soul and deed" (Lukács, 1971: 29) or, as I would put it, between universalist ideals and a reality that contradicts them. Philosophy, then, is also compelled to step back from this precipice of perfect conformity between concept and world – a perfect universalist ideal that recognizes nothing outside itself – lest it undo itself as philosophy.

Philosophy repeatedly finds itself at a fork in the road.

One path leads from its initial refusal of the social world back toward engagement with it. Having questioned established authorities, philosophy conducts its own, independent investigations into the nature of the world. Different resulting ontologies are then taken to imply different ways of living or different ways of organizing political life. Eventually, philosophy develops branches known in the Western tradition as ethics and political theory, and these in turn give birth to social science, when figures like Marx, Durkheim, and Weber deepen the empirical foundation of philosophical investigation by confronting abstract philosophical concepts with their usage in society.

But another path leads philosophy farther away from the social world. When philosophy demonstrates that established beliefs are false, that immediate sense perception is unreliable, that appearances betray essences and prevailing opinion obscures the truth, philosophy is tempted to withdraw from all these sources of error, seeking consolation in non-empirical meditation, which promises access to deeper Truths, immutable Ideas, ultimate Being – essences less flawed than worldly, human communities with all their intellectual caprices. In this process of withdrawal, philosophy pulls certain ideas out of their prior context, separating them from the confusion of everyday speech and the specialized rituals of practical use. The resulting concepts, freed from their erstwhile moorings, are no longer defined by reference to the social world that created them. They become self-referential (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 22), self-grounded, absolute. This gives them critical power, as the world can be held up to the measure of ideas rather than ideas being subordinated to the world. But when philosophical concepts are strung together into self-contained systems, in which each concept is explained only by other concepts in the system, philosophy can believe itself self-sufficient, exempt from external challenge. Philosophical systems begin to translate all things into their own concepts, negating the possibility of real confrontation between philosophy and world, which would require the translation of concepts into the language of other things. Eventually, it can become difficult to distinguish philosophy from the type of common sense and dogma it was meant to challenge.

Fortunately, philosophy doesn't end there. When philosophers sense that the discipline has become too comfortable with its own concepts, they reach outside their field in search of critical renewal. To take just a few examples from what became known as the Western tradition: Plato, in his dialogues, maintained the dramatic fiction that he reached his conclusions not purely through disputations with other philosophers, by also debating with men in the streets. Aristotle embarked on the empirical investigation of language, literature, and natural phenomena, developing philosophical categories that responded to these empirical findings. Later generations looked to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as impulses to rethink established philosophical doctrine in light of other approaches to value and truth (despite the resistance of many of their coreligionists, who saw philosophy as a challenge to the authority of dogma or revelation). In the early modern period, religious and scientific revolutions challenged philosophy again. But at that point, when theology, natural science, and social science separated themselves from philosophy, many philosophers responded by retreating into their own concepts again, even while other fields would repeatedly borrow from philosophy and translate it into other terms.

Anthropology has represented one of the most ambitious of such projects of translation, adjusting philosophy's concepts to its own needs. But it can also be seen as a source of renewal for philosophy itself.

The promise of anthropology

It was something like a personal renewal of philosophy that I was looking for when, after studying philosophy in college, I went to graduate school in anthropology. I loved the philosophy I had first encountered, when teachers encouraged us to learn the methods of philosophical reason and apply them to our world. But the farther I advanced in the field, the more disappointed I became, until I came to the conclusion that a philosophy department (especially a department focused on the creative, stylish, and dynamic Continental philosophy that interested me) was one of the last places on earth where people were free to really practice philosophy. It was as if the more we learned about the great things that had been said before us, the more vigilantly we guarded against saying anything lowly in comparison. People who conduct research in a departments of anthropology are called anthropologists. But people who research in departments of philosophy are only researchers *of* philosophy, rarely daring to don the title of "philosopher".

Perhaps this state of affairs reflects a commendable element of humility. Are our ideas really ready to be forced on a world that already has so many great ideas? Should experienced philosophers be compelled to suffer yet another excited repetition of banal insights that have already been said better before? By now I've lived through enough careless barroom symposia to appreciate this hesitancy and circumspection, but the overall effect on the academic field has been deadening. In the field supposedly dedicated to the creation of concepts, students learn instead about concepts already created long ago. So, I turned to anthropology, where I saw people actively creating new concepts, with less fear of ridicule. Instead of studying the history of great ideas responding to other great ideas, there I could draw new ideas from the rich material of the social world.

At the time, I hadn't yet encountered Tim Ingold's clever phrase that anthropology is "philosophy with the people in". Later, when I heard the phrase and dug up the text where it first appeared (Ingold, 1992: 696), I was in equal parts excited and disappointed. The phrase invoked exactly the kind of philosophy I had always wanted to do, but it said little about what this anthropological approach might actually mean for philosophy. Here and elsewhere (e.g. Ingold, 2008; 2014; 2018), Ingold says a great deal about how anthropology should embrace its inherent capacity to philosophize, but he says very little about philosophy's unrealized potential to anthropologize. Philosophy, in his brief depiction, appears at its worst (philosophers rarely "enlist the help of ordinary people", Ingold, 1992: 696; philosophy, leaving out the people, becomes only a "flaccid, hollow shell", Ingold, 2014), while anthropology appears at its best, capable of exceeding philosophy in everything the old, decrepit discipline had tried to do.

I prefer not to write from the position of the one discipline against the other. I'm interested in understanding how each works through its internal contradictions, sometimes showing its worst tendencies (that is, its most limited and self-defeating), but sometimes (especially when it draws from the other discipline) showing its best. Anthropology, as I see it, doesn't replace philosophy by placing the people in it. Anthropology can *show* philosophy how to place the people in it, enabling philosophy to revitalize itself when it has become inadequate to its own idea. But when anthropology likewise fails to live up to its idea, the study of the people might benefit from a shot or two of philosophy.

Anthropology, like philosophy, is still grappling with the difficult conditions of its birth in a fraught relationship with money and empire. Modern mercantile states, with their vast colonial reach, not only spurred anthropologists to think in global terms, but also provided them with infrastructure, diplomatic permission, and funding to encounter a vast array of people from backgrounds unlike their own. Yet the first anthropologists, like the first philosophers, were uncomfortable with the social conditions that made their field possible. They recorded and sometimes protested against the destructive results of the imperial-mercantile encounter, but instead of countering imperial unreason with the autonomous use of reason, anthropologists countered imperial reason by turning to the reasoning of people who had had gone unrecognized and unprotected during the expansion of empires. While philosophy's authority as a counterweight to power has rested on the purity of its reason, on its internal consistency and independence from the temptations of power and money, anthropology's authority is greater the more it is impure, the more it can complicate the sublime claims of the powerful by forcing dominant reason to acknowledge the messy stuff of the world.

In putting "the people in" philosophy, anthropology was able to frame the great questions of philosophy in a new way, at a moment when philosophy's critical autonomy was threatened by its imperial use. When expanding empires drew on philosophy to declare that they acted in accordance with universally valid reason, anthropology could draw attention to the reason of dominated subjects. When empires justified mistreatment by claiming that their new subjects failed to measure up to humanist ideals, anthropology could show that those ideals failed to account for the full variability of human experience. Categories of thought could not be adequately understood through pure reason projected or imposed on all people, but they could be studied as reflections of differing societies and changing cultural systems.

But even if anthropology challenged philosophical universalism, its intentions have never been fundamentally anti-universalist. Anthropology's particularism came embedded in a claim to universalism: the idea that we can only understand the full reality of the human by taking into account its variability, including all the particulars that philosophy has been inclined to overlook. Anthropologists have a reputation for deflating universalistic generalizations by uncovering exceptions to them, but the field's underlying premise is that by accounting for these exceptions we can reach a better understanding of the whole. Only in a field that raises questions about the whole of humanity – a field that cares about the accuracy of generalizations – does it make sense to look at particular cases as *exceptions* to general rules.

When, as a PhD student based in Chicago, I was conducting fieldwork on folklore performance in Slovakia, my interlocutors often expressed surprise that my teachers and colleagues back home were interested enough in Slovak folklore to allow me to write a dissertation about it. But the truth was that they *weren't* interested in it. It was my task to make them interested. This is what distinguishes anthropology from fields like Latin American studies, English literature, medieval Czech history, Slovak folkloristics, or twentieth-century Continental philosophy: anthropologists' colleagues are *a priori* interested in nothing, because they are interested in everything. As anthropologists, we can never simply describe our material or simply fill gaps in existing research; we are compelled to explain why our material is interesting, how it contributes to a general understanding of a phenomenon relevant to other people. Anthropologists are required to be generalists, even when we analyze the most unusual and atypical of cases.

When we generalize, we expect to find our generalizations confronted by exceptions. And when we particularize (so to speak), we do so in order to specify generalizations, to explain differences, to demand and justify the inclusion of excluded particularities in the whole of knowledge. In the process, we move from saying, "human beings do X" to saying, "under these conditions, these people do X, because they are organized in these ways, and when their conditions change, their actions will change accordingly." This specified generalization leads not to a classification of distinct types of behavior or society, but to explanations of how specific behaviors and social structures affect one another.

This approach to the problem of universalism should enable us to revisit anthropology's longstanding contention that "ordinary people" (Ingold, 1992: 696), "primitive men" (Radin, 1927), or "cannibals" (Viveiros de Castro, 2014) can be philosophers. The value of this contention is not only to in showing that people untrained in Western philosophy can have philosophical thoughts, but also that they can do something philosophy *can't* do: they can point to philosophy's limits, to the incompleteness of its universality, to its need to expand. The point is not just that non-philosophers (non-Philosophers) have philosophy, but also that *because they are philosophy's others* they can philosophize differently, bringing something to philosophy that pure reason never can. When philosophy becomes enmeshed in projects of civilization, the "ordinary", "primitive", "cannibal", or we might say *barbarian* element occupies a specific structural position in the world philosophical system. This position – below the heights or outside the centers of established power, the barbarian element that sounds to the civilized ear like nonsense – enables anthropology to see philosophy with a view from afar (Lévi-Strauss 1985) and tell it what it's missing.

But while anthropology views philosophy from a specific position, the raw material of its thought is larger than the material of philosophy. Rather than beginning with ideas already considered philosophical, anthropology begins by withholding judgment, which enables it to look for philosophical concepts anywhere. But this still requires conceptual work on the anthropologists' part. Philosophers, whether they are defending concepts or criticizing them, begin with the presumption that these concepts have universal reach. Anthropologists, by contrast, begin with systems of thought that are *made particular* by virtue of their exclusion from established systems. *Then* it can be the work of anthropology to make them universal, placing them at the disposition of philosophy, and freeing philosophy from the monopoly of philosophers.

An overlooked or taken-for-granted idea can be held up for anthropological appraisal. It can taken out of one context and held up against another idea for the sake of comparison or for the sake of tracing its historical development. Its component parts can be analyzed, its implications drawn out. It can be brought into conversation with other ideas, made to contradict them, made into a part of new arguments, new theories, new philosophies. A conception of the social organization of thought (through the notion of the totem, cf. Durkheim, 1947; Lévi-Strauss, 1964), a look at the world through the prism of gift-giving (through the concept of *hau*, Mauss, 1967), a concept that connects personal power to collective energy (*mana*, see Mazzarella, 2017), all these, derived from specific cultural contexts, can become self-contained totalities with a potentially universal range of applicability. Anthropology, in other words, can ask what happens to an idea when it is treated the way philosophers treat their own concepts. And then we can ask (with Viveiros de Castro, 2014; and Col and Graeber, 2011) how philosophers' own concepts hold up when confronted with the concepts uncovered and cultivated by anthropologists.

With the distinction between the emic and the etic (however old-fashioned it may seem to contemporary anthropologists), anthropology has a tool that could be of enormous use to philosophers, who easily forget just how emic their own concepts are, how their concepts are embedded in sociocultural context, however broadly they are applied. But the same could be said of anthropologists themselves when they employ the emic/etic distinction too readily and too rigidly, forgetting that every etic idea (every concept employed to analyze other ideas) is also an emic term, insofar as it participates in a particular cultural system, while every emic term (every term treated as a mere object of research) can become etic when it treated as a source of concepts placed on a plane with other concepts. Anthropology can only fulfil its promise of intellectual openness by recognizing the emic and the etic as a dynamic opposition, in which any given object can pass easily between the two poles. And philosophy could follow suit, making its concepts always potentially universal as well as particular – always potentially a part of the specific cultural system in which they take shape *and* permitted to play a part in the intellectual debates of the whole world.

Anthropology could also help philosophy to break out from what I like to call the "cult of philosophical personalities" – the well-known, much maligned, and incredibly persistent tendency of philosophers to refer only to other famous philosophers, to speak less about concepts than about the individuals who once uttered them, a practice that sometimes devolves into a ritualized defense of great men who came before us. Anthropology, after all, has some experience analyzing the charisma of big men and the worship of ancestors, and even if such practices can sometimes fulfill legitimate social functions, they should be recognized for what they are, and they should not be mistaken for the kind of radical questioning that is supposed to be philosophy's defining mission. If philosophy takes seriously anthropology's suggestion that anyone can potentially philosophize – that anyone can question received ideas and propose new ones – then maybe the lowly people who study philosophy but refuse to bow before its big men could finally allow themselves to be philosophers too.

Why anthropology, nevertheless, still needs philosophy

Philosophy, betraying its own idea of itself, is repeatedly declared outmoded and unnecessary, perhaps better replaced by a field like anthropology. But philosophy keeps coming back, and because despite philosophy departments' best efforts to under-mine their discipline, there is still no other field better suited to the development new concepts as such. And at moments when anthropology becomes as lost in the forest of the concrete as philosophy becomes lost in ungrounded abstraction, philosophy might offer what anthropology needs.

If philosophy too quickly takes its concepts to be absolute, anthropology often errs by making its own concepts too relative, which ultimately yields a similar result. An absolute philosophical concept needs nothing outside itself, because it takes itself to be the basis of all else. A purely relative anthropological concept likewise needs nothing outside itself, because it takes itself to be the basis of itself and nothing more. Nothing else can explain it, compare to it, refer to it. The concept is left alone in its pure context. It renounces the philosophical claim to the universal, but, becoming relative to nothing, it becomes absolute in its particularity.

At such moments, anthropologists might do well to become philosophical, provisionally allowing their concepts, derived from concrete analysis, to become abstract and tentatively absolute. They could allow themselves to see the world *as if* these concepts escaped their initial context, becoming applicable everywhere. They could allow their concepts to travel, expand, work through their inner contradictions, and transform the way philosophical concepts do – in the course of debate, where they should be judged according to their coherence, their ability to inspire and provoke new concepts, their applicability to new problems emerging far from their place of origin. And then the concepts could be contextualized again – anthropologized again – reduced and shaped and sharpened by a new configuration of concrete surroundings.

Anthropologists often hesitate before granting general-theoretical validity to the ideas we encounter or derive from specific empirical analysis. I suspect that this results from a misapplication of the principle of participant observation. Although most anthropologists would probably say that the core of participant observation lies in active engagement with our interlocutors, the method results at least as often in detached description, especially when it comes to the study of ideas. The trouble comes when anthropologists shun theory on the grounds that ordinary people (whether they are our readers or our research subjects) are only interested in empirical facts and action. But when we approach people's ideas without dirtying ourselves in theory, we lose the ability to actively engage our interlocutors in conversation, as equals trying to figure out what to do with our shared ideas. Without such participation, only observation remains.

If we politely accept what our interlocutors tell us, and then we report this to readers without inviting them into a critical conversation, we treat neither our sources nor our readers as equals in debate; we don't allow their ideas to step onto the intellectual stage along with the great concepts of philosophy that we readily adopt or criticize. Theory, with its method of abstracting an idea from one context to apply it somewhere else, is what can tell us that our small ideas might be important to others, or that other ideas, previously unfamiliar to us, can speak to our concerns. Theory can turn a few facts about people we don't know into a story that is also about us, because the concrete facts can represent abstract principles and evoke abstract meanings that are ours as well as theirs. And when speaking to people in the field, theory enables us to not only accept their understanding of what they do, nor to force our own understanding onto their actions, but to discuss with them how their story can be told.

Often anthropologists *declare* that they are involved in the world, because they do fieldwork. They proudly retell the discipline's founding myth about how it got up off the armchair and went to work with people in the world. But on what grounds is this specific kind of worldly involvement superior to the involvement of the armchair intellectual who, for example, might write opinion pieces for the newspaper or might expound philosophy in a podcast or write literature or collaborate with artists? Ingold writes that "being-in-the-armchair" is "the precise opposite of being-in-the-world" (Ingold, 2008: 82). Much as I appreciate the dig at Heidegger (my favorite example of everything that can go wrong with philosophy), are the two terms really opposites? Why is this kind of assertion so natural for anthropologists that it goes without need for explanation? What if the armchair were part of the world?

"[G]round knowing in being", Ingold writes, "in the world rather than the armchair…any study of human beings must be a study *with* them" (Ingold, 2008: 83). But what if withdrawing from the world were a part of being in it? This moment of withdrawal, stigmatized by association with the comfortable, *grand bourgeois* armchair, has been symbolically banished from anthropological method. Withdrawal is presented at best as the naïve domain of ignorant theorists, at worst as a temptation to the colonialist comfort and privilege of thinking about the world without having to be in it. But anthropology thereby refuses to recognize this other way of being in the world: engaging in the world by occasionally sitting down, reflecting on it, and actively debating the value of the concepts that the world has thrown at us. Could we begin to understand philosophers too (and artists, essayists, poets, public intellectuals) as participant observers of their own sort? They too enter concrete social situations and join in conversations about what those situations mean. While anthropology tries to engage through active participation, philosophy engages through critical disengagement. Either mode can veer into complete disengagement if practitioners take only the most comfortable course.

There is a certain irony in the fact that anthropology has become so known for its analyses of empirical specificity, since as I argued above, anthropology has to generalize more than any other empirical field in order to explain why its empirical studies are significant. Theory is what makes a case matter. Which is another way of saying that it's what enables the ideas of our interlocutors to take their place on the armchairs of the world.[7]

This is not to say that all theory is philosophy. Rather, theory happens when the philosophical method is applied to empirical material, yielding a generalized conception of specific aspects of the world, from which new concepts are continually distilled. The philosophical method takes knowledge about specific phenomena and makes abstractions from them; it brings these abstractions into a provisionally autonomous sphere (we could call it the plane of being-in-the-armchair), where they are brought into contact with other abstractions and subjected to the play of reason, speculation, critique, debate. Philosophy, as a method, pushes us to ask big questions, before we get up off the armchair to look for answers in the rest of the world.

---

[7] This is how we might read a work like Viveiros de Castro's *Cannibal Metaphysics* (Viveiros de Castro, 2014): as a sort of thought experiment asking what might happen if we allowed indigenous Amazonians to sit for a while on the philosophers' armchairs.

Looking for anthropos: toward a barbarian universalism

Among the biggest of those questions raised by philosophy is the question at the origins of anthropology: *What is the human being*? Modern Western philosophy made the human being one of its central problems, eventually establishing a field of enquiry known as "philosophical anthropology". But the philosophical concept of the human began is one-sidedly abstract and prematurely universal. Within the field of philosophy, this abstract universalism was challenged most famously by Herder, who called for a concept of humanity grounded in cultural context (or to use his preferred terms, the context of cultivation, *Bildung*, as realized among different peoples, *Völker*). On the margins of philosophy, the young Marx embarked on a parallel project, insisting that the human being could only be understood as a result of socially structured practice. Both Herder and Marx were part of a broad intellectual field in which critics of Enlightenment philosophy – who sympathized with Enlightenment ideals but not with its cultural myopia and its lack of interest in social practice – argued that universality can only be reached through the detour of potentially infinite particularity.

But probably no one did more than Franz Boas and those around him to establish a field of study of the human being in its concrete variability. In contrast to older, philosophical anthropology, which abstractly analyzed the characteristics of the human being as such, this new anthropology was to pass through concrete cultural and biological particularity and varieties of the social organization of human life on its way to reassembling the human being as general concept. If anthropology is "philosophy with the people in", philosophy might be rightly called anthropology with the human being as such in it. Taken by itself, this abstract humanism is never enough. But it gave anthropology the impulse to look for the human in a new way, through a great intellectual detour.

The central position of humanism in anthropology has recently been called into question, as ecological concerns and renewed interest in indigenous ontologies have raised the issue of anthropocentrism and opened the field of anthropology to non-human subjects, justifiably warning against the dangers of championing human subjectivity against nature and environment. This, however, needs not pose a fundamental challenge to the humanist project laid out by Boasian anthropology. This anthropological humanism does not define *a priori* what the human is, but examines concrete manifestations of the human, with an eye for every possible expansion and redefinition of the human category. Every anthropology sees the world through human eyes, but it also asks what the human behind those eyes can be. Anthropology is a *question*, to which every humanism is a possible answer – including post-humanism and what Viveiros de Castro, drawing from Patrice Maniglier (Maniglier, 2000), calls "an interminable humanism that constantly challenges the constitution of humanity" (Viveiros de Castro, 2014: 44–45). The *anthropos* we are looking for is continually changing, expanding, accumulating new dimensions, new particularity.

Kant, perhaps the most influential thinker of abstract humanism, tried to understand the human being by analyzing the fundamental categories of human thought. Anthropology, inspired most directly by Durkheim (1947), has responded by making categories into questions of sociocultural analysis. In such analyses we find anthropology best prepared to address philosophies, inserting them in social context and challenging them to revise their concepts, revealing the intellectual shape of societies and pointing to societies' principal axes of power and transgression. By analyzing the lines that separate categories from one another, anthropology shows how humans relate to established categories, aligning themselves within them and against them, enforcing them or challenging them, decrying unjustified separations, and calling for new distinctions. Philosophy enters the fray by challenging established categories and proposing new ones that expand the human understanding of the whole. Thanks to the Boasian tradition, we can respond to abstractly universal "philosophical anthropology" with a concretely differentiated *anthropological philosophy* that investigates culturally embedded categories and the possibilities of their transgression.

I began these reflections with G. M. Tamás's paean to philosophical universalism. I'll conclude with reference to another essay by Tamás (Tamás, 2010), where he identifies philosophy's struggle against the division and categorization of people with a struggle against the civilization responsible for such division. "Civilization", he writes, is "a whole comprehensive system of separations" – between the propertied and propertyless, men and women, leaders and led, and on and on. The legacy of the Enlightenment, with its modern interpretation of ancient philosophy, has trained us to see philosophy as a mark of civilization, a voice of high-minded universalism that speaks from a position of power, declaiming to the world its proper categories of thought. But Tamás places philosophy on the side of the barbarians that aim to break down the categories of the civilized world that keep people in their places. When civilizations divide the substance of thought into categories convenient to ruling powers, separating thinkers from one another, channeling ideas into harmless forms – then a barbarous philosophy responds with a contrary universalism. Instead of imposing universal systems of distinction and categorization, it questions the categories that are the basis of civilization, and it calls for something still more universal.

In order to accomplish this, I would add, philosophy needs to stand outside the heights of civilization. It needs to see civilization from the outside, from the position of the negatively categorized and the de-categorized. This is where anthropology stands. And I can think of no more honorable label for the discipline than to call it a *barbarous philosophy*. A philosophy that anthropologizes universalist concepts, questions them, confronts them with the concepts of the excluded, and provokes us to imagine alternative civilizations that could respond to the challenge set out by anthropology's barbarous universalism.

References

Arola, Adam. 2011. Native American Philosophy. In *The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy*, edited by William Edelglass and Jay L. Garfield. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press: 562–573.

Baldry, H. C. 1965. *The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought*. Cambridge: The University Press.

Bobzien, Susanne. 2020. Ancient Logic. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Stanford, Calif.: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/logic-ancient/.

Chun, Shan. 2012. Chinese Cosmopolitanism (Tianxia). In *Major Aspects of Chinese Religion and Philosophy: Dao of Inner Saint and Outer King* by Shan Chun. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer: 203–212.

Cicero, Marcus Tullius. 1877. *Tusculan Disputations*. Translated by C. D. Yonge. New York: Harper & Brothers.

Col, Giovanni da, and Graeber, David. 2011. Foreword: The Return of Ethnographic Theory. *HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory* 1 (1): vi–xxxv.

Cua, Antonio S. 2008. The Emergence of the History of Chinese Philosophy. In *The Routledge History of Chinese Philosophy*, edited by Bo Mou. London: Routledge: 43–68.

Das, Veena, Jackson, Michael, Kleinman, Arthur, and Singh, Bhrigupati (eds.) 2014. *The Ground Between: Anthropologists Engage Philosophy*. Durham: Duke University Press Books.

Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Félix. 1994. *What Is Philosophy?* Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York: Columbia University Press.

Dismas, Masolo. 2016. African Sage Philosophy. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford, Calif.: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/african-sage/.

Durkheim, Émile. 1947. *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. Translated by Joseph Ward. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.

Edelglass, William, and Garfield, Jay L. (eds). 2011. *The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Gillon, Brendan. 2023. Logic in Classical Indian Philosophy. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman. Stanford, Calif.: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/logic-india/.

Giri, Ananta Kumar, and Clammer, John (eds). 2013. *Philosophy and Anthropology: Border Crossing and Transformations*. London: Anthem Press.

Graeber, David. 2014. *Debt: The First 5,000 Years*. Brooklyn, N.Y.: Melville House.

Halim, Hala. 2013. *Alexandrian Cosmopolitanism: An Archive*. Fordham University Press.

Heater, Derek. 1996. *World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ilyenkov, Evald, and Korovikov, Valentin Ivanovich. 2019. Theses on the Question of the Interconnection of Philosophy and Knowledge of Nature and Society in the Process of Their Historical Development. In *Philosophical Thought in Russia in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century: A Contemporary View from Russia and Abroad*, edited by Vladislav A. Lektorsky and Marina F. Bykova, translated by David Bakhurst. New York and London: Bloomsbury Academic: 66–77.

Ingold, Tim. 1992. Editorial. *Man,* New Series, 27 (4): 693–96.

Ingold, Tim. 2008. Anthropology Is Not Ethnography. *Proceedings of the British Academy* 154: 69–92.

Ingold, Tim. 2014. Anthropology and Philosophy or the Problem of Ontological Symmetry. *La Clé Des Langues,* February. https://cle.ens-lyon.fr/anglais/litterature/entretiens-et-textes-inedits/anthropology-and-philosophy-or-the-problem-of-ontological-symmetry.

Ingold, Tim. 2018. *Anthropology: Why It Matters*. Cambridge: Polity.

Lavan, Myles, Payne, Richard E., and Weisweiler, John. 2016. *Cosmopolitanism and Empire: Universal Rulers, Local Elites, and Cultural Integration in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1964. *Totemism*. Translated by Rodney Needham. London: Merlin Press.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1985. *The View from Afar.* Translated by Joachim Neugroschel and Phoebe Hoss. New York: Basic Books.

Lukács, György. 1971a. Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat. In *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, translated by Rodney Livingstone. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press: 83–222.

Lukács, György. 1971b. *The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Forms of Great Epic Literature.* Translated by Anna Bostock. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.

Maniglier, Patrice. 2000. L'humanisme Interminable de Lévi-Strauss. *Les Temps Modernes*, no. 609: 216–241.
Marx, Karl. 1978. Marx on the History of His Opinions. In *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by Robert C. Tucker. New York: Norton: 3–6.
Mauss, Marcel. 1967. *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies*. Translated by Ian Cunnison. New York: Norton.
Mazzarella, William. 2017. *The Mana of Mass Society*. Chicago Studies in Practices of Meaning. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Radin, Paul. 1927. *Primitive Man as Philosopher*. New York: Appleton.
Seaford, Richard. 2004. *Money and the Early Greek Mind: Homer, Philosophy, Tragedy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shell, Marc. 1978. *The Economy of Literature*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Tamás, Gáspár Miklós. 2010. Communism on the Ruins of Socialism. In *Art Always Has Its Consequences*. Zagreb: WHW: 75–82.
Tamás, Gáspár Miklós. 2014. Une Promesse de Bonheur: Philosophy as the Antecedent of the Nether World of Communism. In *Really Useful Knowledge*. Madrid: Museo nacional centro de arte Reina Sofía (MNCARS): 215–230.
Tamás, Gáspár Miklós. 2016. *K Filosofii Socialismu*. Edited by Pavel Siostzonek and Joseph Grim Feinberg. Translated by Pavel Siostzonek. Filosofia.
Thomson, George. 1949. *Studies in Ancient Greek Society*. Vol. II: The First Philosophers. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo. 2014. *Cannibal Metaphysics*. Translated by Peter Skafish. Minneapolis: Univocal.
William, Marshall D. 2023. Logic and Language in Early Chinese Philosophy. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman. Stanford, Calif.: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/chinese-logic-language/.

Joseph Grim Feinberg
feinberg@flu.cas.cz

Institute of Philosophy
Czech Academy of Sciences